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This paper summarizes results of case studies and panel group discussions carried 
out in Zimbabwe recently to find out the relationship between land rights and 
agricultural efficiency, investment and land markets in the smallholder agricultural 
sector. Results indicate that primary land user rights holders in the three perceived 
land tenure categories studied do not see security of tenure as a major problem. The 
major limiting factors cited as reasons for failure to realize full agricultural 
production potential include lack of or problem with one of the following: draft 
power, labor, credit, rural-urban migration and the AIDS pandemic among others. 
The opposite is true of secondary user rights holders such as grown up sons living 
with parents and some women and other social weak groups who indicate tenure 
insecurity as a problem of equal magnitude to the other limitations stated above. 
The results also show some relationship between investment and land rights 
between the small-scale commercial farming sector and the other two sectors 
(resettlement and communal). Total credit received is not significantly related to 
the form of land rights enjoyed by landowners. Land markets in the three categories 
are thin and ‘transaction costs’ are high limiting the amount of agricultural land 
that changed hands. Women access to and control over land, and their bargaining 
power with their husbands and relatives about land are weak across the three 
categories studied. 
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While it can be true that security of property rights in Zimbabwe can be a 
fundamental constraint to the long term development of the smallholder 
agricultural sector, there has been little thorough work done to date of the 
relationship between land rights and agricultural efficiency, investment and land 
markets in this sector. This study was an attempt to gain an insight into this 
relationship. It was carried out in two communal areas, two resettlement areas and 
one small-scale commercial area.  The three of which are perceived to belong to 
communal, resettlement and freehold tenure systems respectively. The two selected 
study areas in each category except for the small-scale commercial farming area 
allowed making a comparison between different agro-ecological zones in each 
category. The objective of the study was to investigate if the three perceived land 
tenure forms meant any difference in the day to day economic and farming decisions 
of the landowners and users with reference to the above stated relationship. 
 
Background Literature  
 
Communal Areas of Zimbabwe 
 
Under the customary tenure system found in Zimbabwe's communal areas 
authority over land is exercised by chiefs with the help of councils of elders. It is 
assumed that the system has checks and balances. However, it might not be the 
case as land becomes a scarce resource. 
 
Rights of usufruct are allocated to an individual, usually a male, by a chief for as 
long as he may need it or is cultivating on it. The rights of usufruct in an area the 
individual lives also include the right to graze livestock, fetching fuel wood, 
thatching grass, wild fruit and vegetables and hunting game. There are no controls 
to rights of access to these things as they are considered "free" goods. 
 
The rights of usufruct can be passed on as inheritance on the death of the original 
owner. The inheritor of the land is based on primogeniture but the wife or wives of 
the deceased can continue to cultivate the land. Inheritance is complicated where 
there is polygamy. 
 
Communal areas represent 41% of all land in Zimbabwe, 74% of it in Natural 
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Resettlement Areas of Zimbabwe 
 
Resettlement schemes are a product of the post-independence government policy to 
resettle landless people mainly from the congested communal areas on acquired 
large-scale commercial farms.  
 
A permit system is utilised in the resettlement schemes (Government of Zimbabwe, 
1998). The settlers' permits do not indicate the period for which they are valid but 
in practice they could be valid for as long as the settler does not violate the 
conditions of the permit. These conditions include relinquishing usufruct rights in 
communal areas and also not getting employment outside the boundary of the 
resettlement scheme.    
 
Resettlement areas represent 9% of all land in Zimbabwe. 
 
Small-Scale Commercial Farming Areas of Zimbabwe 
 
The small-scale commercial farming sector was created by the pre-independence 
government in 1930 under the Land Apportionment Act. It was formerly called 
African Purchase Areas. The sector covers 1,2 million hectares of land mainly in 
Natural Farming Regions 111 (35,4%) and 1V (38,2%). The average farm size is 124 
hectares. 
 
Although the small-scale commercial farming scheme was introduced as far back as 
1930 the Rukuni Commission (1994) reported that only 48 percent of land holders 
had fully paid and received title deeds. Fifty two percent were still leasing the land 
from government as they had not yet fully paid for the land. The conditions of the 
lessee are as follows: residing on the farm permanently, practising farming for the 
exclusive benefit of himself and his family, not to subdivide the farm or enter into 
any form of farming partnerships and must practise good husbandry. 
  
Small-scale commercial areas represent 3.5% of all land in Zimbabwe. 
 
In general rights over land are divided into use rights (grazing, farming, collection 
and others); transfer rights (movement of ownership or possession through 
inheritance, gift, sale, lending etc) and administrative rights (the authority to 
allocate or withdraw land from use, tax it, to arbitrate disputes, regulate transfers 




The Panel Group Discussions and Case Studies were carried out in Chinyika and 
and Gutu Resettlement Schemes, Zimuto and Chiendambuya Communal Areas and 
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discussions focussed on land rights and agricultural performance issues, whilst case 
studies investigated land markets and investment issues.  
 
Stratified random sampling was used to select participants for both group 
discussions and case studies. This was desirable to ensure a fair gender 
representation.  In both cases one third of the participants were female headed 
households and the rest male headed households. Each panel group comprised of an 
average of twelve people. Case studies involved household heads.  
 
The analysis of the study draws on the World Bank's theoretical framework of 
rights-based tenure security variables (user and disposal rights). The Bank uses 
farmers' perceptions of their rights over their land as proxies for tenure security. 
The greater the number of rights conferred by the tenure arrangement, the greater 
the potential value of the land resource to the holders (Bruce and Migot-adholla, 
1994). 
 




The interviews show that primary land holders in all the three land tenure 
categories have the right to choose crops, right to plant trees and invest. Small-scale 
commercial farming landowners also enjoy to some extent rights to sell and rent 
land. Properly executed land sales and rentals are recorded in the interviews. 
 
In addition to individual land rights to arable and residential plots resettlement 
and communal landholders also enjoy rights to common resources such as grazing 






















Rights to land and tenure security 
  
Table 1. Nature of Rights to Land held by gender 
 
                                 Communal        Resettlement Areas       Small-Scale      
                                 Areas                                                        Commercial  Area 
 
No. of female            2 (1.7%)             15 (12.5%)                    4 (6.7%) 
primary rights  
holders 
 












Total                         120 (100%)        120 (100%)                     60 (100%) 
Grand total=300 
Source: Field work data 2002 
 
There were more male primary land rights holders (see Table 1 above) than females 
in all three tenure categories, confirming the gender imbalances in land ownership 
and control found in most patriarchal communities. 
 
In all the three land tenure categories, secondary land rights holders-derived rights 
holders-(individuals who gain access rights to grow crops on agricultural plots 
controlled by other people) feel insecure. For example married and grown up sons 
staying with parents in resettlement schemes consider the current arrangement 
temporary and would wish to own their land independently somewhere. In 
Chinyika sons also reported that some parents are more interested to rent out there 
unused plots to tobacco growers who pay them well rather than subletting their 
land to their sons as gifts and receive nothing. This made them feel even more 
insecure and less prepared to making long term investments such as planting trees 
or contributing towards the fencing of the plots. People treated as squatters in 
Chiendambuya communal area feel very insecure as they encounter numerous M. Mutema / The International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 2 2003 
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clashes with members of the local community. Even in the small-scale commercial 
farming sector where land was abundantly available to meet requirements of all 
family members not every family member feel equally secure. 
In both communal areas studied (Chiendambuya and Zimuto) the notion that land 
is not owned in any absolute by the man and his household who live on and 
cultivate it, is disappearing. Efforts by traditional leaders (chiefs, headmen and 
kraal heads) to maintain their role of a coherent system of land rights in which they 
are the overlord, while the individual land holder and his household participate by 
his allegiance to a particular chief, being a member of a particular village at every 
point and by the particular cultural idiom of his tribal group are vehemently facing 
resistance from plot holders. In some cases lack of trust and respect of the 
traditional leaders bring this about. Panel participants reported leaders who 
allocated land corruptly and biased when mediating on land disputes. The situation 
is worsened by conflict in the allocation of land rights, particularly between 
traditional leaders and local government structures. There is no clarity on the roles 
and functions of the various institutions at local level over the issue of land and 
natural resource management resulting in confusion, uncertainty and even 
corruption.  
 
Despite perceived absolute land ownership by even those landholders in communal 
and resettlement areas some still strongly treat land as a non-tradable commodity. 
This seems to stem from lack of legal framework to engage in a land market without 
being cheated and the perception of land as both their pension and insurance. 
 
Whilst all landholders in resettlement areas must have a permit which states the 
conditions of land ownership most of the participants do not have or have even seen 
the actual permit. They feel they are secure and can use the land in perpetuity 
despite the fact that the actual permit contains a clause stating that land rights can 
be revoked anytime without compensation to any improvements. The blame can 
again be partly apportioned to poor land administration since the removal of 
resettlement officers. The local councils and other local structures that replaced 
resettlement officers are widely questioned and viewed as illegitimate, of little 
credibility and effectiveness and without power to implement their proposed roles. 
 
Whilst land rights granted to smallholders epitomised those existing under freehold 
tenure they have some defects. For example panel group discussion participants 
reported that when the scheme started alienation of land to other people (transfer of 
land between members of the community) was not permissible, and although 
mortgaging of land was permitted it was strictly controlled. 
 
In all the three tenure categories studied it can be generalised that all the land 
right holders enjoy stable and secure use rights in perpetuity, but transfer rights 
and administrative rights are not clearly defined, and are the major source of land 




The study shows that non-tenure constraints such as draft power, labour, lack of 
input credit and harsh farming conditions (unreliable rainfall and poor soils) are 
very important and need to be addressed. 
 
Panel Groups’ perceptions of main agricultural constraints 
 
The most frequently mentioned constraints ranked according to the number of 




































  Figure 1. Agricultural constraints in Zimbabwe’s smallholder sector 
Source: Field work data 2002 
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Failure of farmers to get input credit is attributed to a multiplicity of reasons. 
Drought risk (inadequate rains even in a normal season) and poor soils are reported 
in some areas to make borrowing unattractive.  
 
Most smallholder farmers grow maize that is a controlled commodity, and producer 
prices are low. Maize marketing is a monopoly of the state run Grain Marketing 
Board which is heavily indebted. With borrowing interests as high as 60% it is only 
high value crops fetching high selling prices such as tobacco which can guarantee 
returns good enough to enable loan repayment.  
 
The other problem of smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe with loans is the general 
bad perception of farmers to the notion of borrowing. This negative attitude towards 
borrowing is partially attributed to the government in its handling of input loans to 
farmers in the 1980s. Most farmers received inputs through an extensive 
government loan input programme but it was not made clear to farmers that they 
would be required to repay the loans and politicians even went further to discourage 
willing farmers from repaying the loans. Eventually the government owned 
agricultural bank, which had guaranteed the loans, was faced with collapse and was 
forced to act on defaulting farmers in a sweeping move. The bank debt collectors 
confiscated any valuable assets of the defaulting farmers that they could lay their 
hands on. This was traumatic to the farmers who were caught unaware and some of 
them are still smarting from this experience. This was a nation wide event and 
widely covered by the media and it tainted the reputation of most smallholder 
farmers borrowing eligibility with other financial institutions in the country.  
 
Banks have also repeatedly voiced their concern of lack of collateral by smallholder 
farmers. Even the small-scale commercial farmers with title deeds are perceived by 
financial institutions with suspicion for the reason that the type of freehold they 
have is conditional. 
 
Table 2. Input loan 2001-2002 
 
Amount (ZW$)  Communal Areas  Resettlement Areas    Small-Scale Commercial 
 
0                           55 (45.8%)               45 (37.5%)                  32 (53.3%) 
<1000                   24 (20%)                  8 (6.7%)                       0 (-) 
1001-2000            39 (32.5%)               25 (20.8%)                   9 (15%) 
2001-4000            2 (1.7%)                   35 (29.2%)                   19 (31.7%) 
4001-6000            0 (-)                          7 (5.8%)                       0 (-) 
 
Total                    120 (100%)              120 (100%)                 60 (100%)    
Source: Field work data 2002 
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Table 3. Input loan 2000-2001 
 
Amount (ZW$)  Communal Areas  Resettlement Areas    Small-Scale Commercial 
0                           120 (100%)              117 (97.5%)                 58 (96.7%) 
3000-4500            0 (-)                          3 (2.5%)                       2 (2.3%) 
 
Total                    120 (100%)              120 (100%)                 60 (100%) 
Source: Field work data 2002 
 
 
Table 4. Input loan 1999-2000 
 
Amount (ZW$)  Communal Areas  Resettlement Areas    Small-Scale Commercial 
0                           120 (100%)              118 (98.3%)                 9 (98.3%) 
2000-5000            0 (-)                          2 (1.7%)                      1 (1.7%) 
 
Total                    120 (100%)              120 (100%)                 60 (100%) 
Source: Field work data 2002 
 
Farmers also expressed ignorance on how to go about the borrowing process with 
banks. 
 
Chimedza (1995) confirms the above credit scenario when she wrote that 
Zimbabwe’s impressive gains in smallholder maize and cotton production in the 
1980s and early 1990s were now being undermined by the erosion of farm support 
services. In 1995, for example, Zimbabwe government’s credit programme was 
reaching less than three percent of its one million communal households. 
 
The intrusion of the extended family structure into the small-scale commercial 
farming sector with its inherent family and inheritance squabbles make it difficult 
even for those farmers who could be in a position to borrow because of lack of 
consensus in running the farms and inheritance disputes.  
 
The small-scale commercial farmers complained that they are left out in most 
government input programs. They feel that they have always been victims of the 
perception that they are commercial farmers who should be able to run their 
farming businesses independently resulting in neglect and that has been the case 
since they started farming. They complain that they have never received a proper 
funding programme, as was the case with their large-scale commercial farming 
counterparts when they started. And they strongly believe they continue to be 
ignored even after independence because they are political and economic 
insignificant.  
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Problems related to labour are mainly pointed to the ravaging AIDS pandemic and 
rural-urban migration especially by the working age group. 
 
Draft power problem is most severe in communal area and much better in the 
small-scale commercial farming area. However, large farm areas (125 hectares on 
average) owned by small-scale commercial farmers in the studied area mean that 
only small portions of these farms are put under use because of limitations of 
animal power on these relatively large farms. If full utilisation is to be achieved 
mechanisation is a necessity. It is also important to point out that farms in 
Mushagashe generally have poor, light sandy, infertile soils and in some places the 
soils are shallow and to get a good yield (for example 3 tonnes of maize per hectare) 




In both resettlement and communal areas land sales and rentals are illegal. 
However, the interviews show that land is exchanging hands through both distress 
sales and sales and rentals borne out of landholders rational decisions. This means 




Examples of land sales encountered include those by elderly people who are living 
alone and can no longer work the soil. They then decide to sell their plots to raise 
money to see them through the rest of their lives while they live with a willing 

















  Figure 2. Land Sales and Rentals in Zimbabwe’s Smallholder Farming Sector 
Source: Field work data 2002 
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through distresses such as illnesses can realise better prices if they can openly look 
for a buyer. But in most cases they end up prey to neighbours or other locals who 
take advantage of their plight and decide for the desperate victim what they want to 
pay. Figure 2 above shows cases of land sales and rentals recorded in the study. 
 
Even traditional leaders in the communal areas who are suppose to be custodians of 
local values and norms are reported to be involved in land sales rackets.  
 
In Chinyika, a tobacco growing area, farmers engaging in tobacco production need 
more land than they size of the plots they were allocated and they rent land from 
their neighbours so that they can fulfil the statutory four year crop rotation meant 
to control tobacco pests and diseases.  
 
Grown up and married sons living with parents expressed their desire to have their 
own plot independent of their parents even if it meant buying.  
 
The informal nature and secrecy of the communal and resettlement land market 
makes ‘transaction costs’1 high especially to outsiders. Even in the small-scale 
commercial farming sector where sales and rentals are permitted transaction costs 
can be high especially for an outsider. There is need to verify thoroughly the exact 
owner before indulging in purchase to avoid problems of getting trapped into family 
ownership squabbles and these can be costly to unsuspecting buyers.  
 
Although title deed transfers are recorded in the land transfer case studies carried 
out in Mushagashe Small-scale Commercial Farming Area it is important to point 
out that many of the farmers interviewed during a formal questionnaire survey 
interview indicated that they did not have the actual title deed. Some are not even 
sure of the ownership status of their farms. This finding is supported by work done 
by the World Bank in conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture of Zimbabwe in 
1993. They found that out of a total of 10600 small-scale commercial farm 
allotments about 48% were held under a conditional freehold title and the balance 
under long term leasehold. It is unlikely that those under long term leasehold are 
aware of that and the implications. Some families never bothered to find out 
because of the ownership acrimony among family members. 
 
Transactional costs caused by information asymmetry especially to outsiders are 
also quoted in the unpublished field notes of the 1994 Zimbabwe Land Tenure 
Commission. It was found that absence of a legal framework in some rural areas 
especially peri-urban areas was making informal land sales more expensive than if 
                                                           
1 Transaction costs in the context of my work refers to purely cognitive costs of organising and 
monitoring land transfers due to ambiguity in property rights. Willing buyers must incur significant 
search, enforcement and sometimes even litigation costs as a result of which a wedge is driven 
between the land’s value of marginal product in the owner’s use and the value of marginal product if 
used by the most productive alternative user (Platteau, 1996). M. Mutema / The International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 2 2003 
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formal sales were allowed. Bribes involved were so exorbitant that they made the 
land more expensive than its true market value. 
 
Through information collected during land transfer investigations the cost of arable 
land per hectare is established (see Table 5 ). 
  
Table 5. Cost of a Hectare of arable land in the three areas  
 
                     Communal Areas      Resettlement Areas     Small- scale commercial 
 
 
Cost/Ha         7500 (3 yrs ago)         6000 (3 yrs ago)              3500 (6 yrs ago) 
(ZW$) 
 Source: Field work data 2002 
 
It is also important to note that interviews demonstrate a conservative group of 
people especially in the communal and resettlement areas, and to some extend even 
in the small-scale commercial farming area, who perceive land as a non-tradable 
commodity that must change hands only through a certain acceptable family 
lineage. Some of the people hold this view so strongly that to them alienation of 
land to outsiders violates deep-rooted social norms.  Bitter resentments and even 
acute tensions can be aroused that may lead to opportunistic acts, and in worst 




Most primary land rights holders in the three land tenure feel secure to make both 
short term and long investments such as planting trees, stumping, making fence 
and construction of contour works. But still some pointed out that it would be 
unwise to invest in a ‘big house’ in the communal or resettlement area where you 
would not be able to sell it or rent it out as good as you would do to a town house 
with a title deed.  
 
Generally, however, there are more investments in the small-scale commercial 
farming area than in the communal and resettlement areas.  
 
Women and land rights  
 
Most of the land related problems encountered by women in the communal, 
resettlement and small-scale commercial farming areas are linked to patriarchy, 
women’s subservient status (women are treated as minors with no signing rights) 
and traditional and societal gender roles. However, some positive changes are 
taking place. A few women are reported to be land permit holders in the 
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campaign run by a non-governmental organisation. However, some elderly women 
are contented with the status quo despite the awareness campaigns being 
contacted. 
 
As for widows and partly divorced women and single women their situation with 
regard to land access and control can best be summarised in the words of 
Rwebangira (1985):  
 
‘A widow has a choice between three evils, to be inherited as a wife, or 
go back to her people (who are these?) and to live where children have 
allocated all of which require her to be a dependent irrespective of the 
number of years she has lived with her deceased husband and 
contributed to the family wealth.’ 
 
Conclusions and policy implications 
 
The importance of land rights and agricultural productivity issues in the small-
scale commercial farming, communal and resettlement areas is underscored by the 
fact that together the three sectors account for fifty five (54) percent of Zimbabwe’s 
agricultural land (3,5 percent, 41.4 percent and 9 percent, respectively) 
(Government of Zimbabwe, 1998). 
 
The study confirms Figueroa (1977) emphasis that land reform realises its greatest 
potential when it serves as framework of other policies which include infrastructure 
development, provision of modern inputs such as credit, extension, research 
activities, pricing policies and efforts towards rural industrialisation. Infrastructure 
development includes road and dam construction and introduction of irrigation 
schemes as mitigation against drought. 
 
It is in view of the above that most World Bank and IMF sponsored structural 
adjustment programmes sometimes face strong criticism. A typical economic 
structural adjustment programme usually prescribes reduction of government 
expenditure and privatisation of state institutions among other things. The 
smallholder farmer, who relies a lot on these institutions and other state 
intervention policies, is adversely affected. As already mentioned, in the case of 
Zimbabwe for example, after the introduction of the Economic Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in the early 1990s government credit programme 
was reaching less than 3 percent of the one million communal farmers in 1995.  
This is compared to over 50 percent in the 1980s before ESAP was introduced. 
Whilst institutional reforms are unavoidable in most cases alternative 
arrangements must be put in place before changes are implemented to cushion the 
vulnerable smallholder farmers during the transitional period.  
 
When implementing a system of land rights and their effects on agricultural 
production it is important to look at the actual stream of rights available to the M. Mutema / The International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 2 2003 
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farmer than to its particular appellation as communal, state and private property. 
Secure tenure to the smallholder producer in some form of individual control over 
land is important.  
 
Tenure security can be increased by putting in place reliable conflict resolution 
mechanisms and removing legislation, which only confuses and threatens property 
rights. The creation of formal private land rights, while they are not necessarily a 
panacea to conflict resolution, has the unambiguous effect of reducing and even 
eliminating transaction costs so as to encourage efficiency promoting transfers of 
land (and investment). 
 
Experience from other parts of the world (especially Asia and Latin America) have 
shown that despite earlier ambitious redistributive land reforms there has been a 
steady trend towards greater rural landlessness (see Table 6) and in many cases a 
new pattern of land concentration (Plant, 1994). 
 
 
  Table 6. Landlessness in some countries 
 
Country                      Landlessness (%) 
Kenya                           32 
Egypt                            60 
Mexico                         60 
Peru                              75 
India                             55 
Chile                             53 
Bangladesh                   78 
Sri Lanka                      43 
Pakistan                        34 
Philippines                    60 
   Source: Sobhan, 1993. 
 
In Zimbabwe resettlement schemes without a land market mechanism there is 
already a new generation of landless families (grown up children of resettled 
families), and the iron is that less than half the allocated land is being utilized.   
 
Women have been observed to be repeatedly among the marginalised with respect 
to land rights in each of the three studied tenure categories. This problem can be 
addressed by among other things policy changes, public awareness and women 
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